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1 Introduction
Threat modeling is recognized as one of the most important activities in soft-
ware security [25]. A threat modeling technique guides the security analyst to
the discovery of the actions that a malicious agent (insider or outsider) might
perform in order to misuse a software system. Threats are often referred to as
anti-requirements and are an important driver for the definition of the security
requirements of a system [24,38,28].
Threat modeling is based on the identification of the system’s valuable assets,
like, for instance, a sensitive information or the availability of certain processing
facilities. Therefore, threat modeling can be applied at several levels of abstrac-
tion, depending on the type of assets considered. From a requirements engineering
perspective, the assets become more tangible when some design decisions are made
and an initial decomposition of the system functionality is chosen. Therefore, early
threat elicitation is best performed as soon as an initial architectural model of the
system is available. For instance, a solution strategy that opts for data centraliza-
tion is affected by different security issues than a system where the data is fully
distributed. Moreover, threats depend on the security assumptions underlying a
given decomposition, as the use of public networks to interconnect the subsystems.
These assumptions are only precisely understood when the high-level decomposi-
tion of the system becomes more concrete.
Threat modeling can be used to analyze the soundness of (initial) software
architectures and to spot flaws early on. The discovered flaws represent an oppor-
tunity to elaborate upon the security requirements of the system and, consequently,
revisit the design choices or refine the architectural model. A popular technique
for threat modeling is Microsoft’s STRIDE [41], which is routinely used on all of
Microsoft’s products [12]. It is endorsed by the most recognized secure software
processes, like Touchpoints [25], OWASP’s CLASP [5] and Microsoft’s SDL [18].
It is also taught in certification programs like CSSLP (www.isc2.org) and used in
the industry [19].
STRIDE is also the subject of ongoing research. For instance, the technique
is being augmented by OWASP in order to become applicable to the domain of
mobile applications [31]. Further, it has been extended for the purpose of privacy
analysis [7]. Finally, researchers are adapting STRIDE to different types of system
models [33,20].
Despite its successful adoption, to date no empirical study has been carried out
to quantify the costs and effectiveness of STRIDE. Presently, the productivity of
an analyst using STRIDE is unknown. As is the average percentage of erroneous
threats produced, or the share of threats that are overlooked. Without such a
knowledge it is difficult to estimate how much time has to be budgeted for the
security analysis of a given software system. Similarly, it is hard to understand
whether the results of the analysis are trustworthy.
The contribution of this paper is a descriptive study evaluating STRIDE by
means of quantitative observations that have been performed in controlled, lab-
oratory conditions in the context of a university course. The study has involved
57 students in their last year of the master in computer science. Contrary to con-
trolled experiments, in a descriptive study a phenomenon is characterized and no
attempt is made to analyze the effects of variables on the phenomenon itself. This
type of study is instrumental in order to understand a technique and eventually
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formulate research hypotheses to be further investigated by means of comparative
experiments. Incisively, Grimes and Schulz portray descriptive studies as “the first
scientific toe in the water in new areas of inquiry” [10]. As STRIDE has never
been studied before, the authors are indeed venturing in a new area of inquiry
and, at this stage, a descriptive study appears to be the most appropriate means
of investigation.
As remarked by Tichy [40], exploratory studies like ours are particularly suited
for the enrollment of university students. Further, students are ideal for investigat-
ing the issues related to a technology’s learning curve, as remarked by Carver et
al. [4]. The authors have paid particular attention to the advice offered by Carver
et al. in order to successfully embed a study in the context of a university course.
In particular, the study has been harmonized with respect to the teaching goals
of the course and the students have been given adequate incentives. These are
important safeguards in order to obtain realistic results.
The participants of the study have been asked to perform the threat analysis
of a medium-size distributed system. The main goal of the study was to evaluate
STRIDE by providing an answer to the following research questions:
– RQ1: Productivity. How many valid threats per hour are produced?
– RQ2: Correctness. Is the number of incorrect threats small?
– RQ3: Completeness. Is the number of overlooked threats small?
The study has been conducted in three subsequent installments of the above-
mentioned university course. In the first two years, we observed the work of the
participants while they were identifying the threats in an early phase of the soft-
ware development life-cycle, namely when the elaboration of the security require-
ments (and of the corresponding controls) had just begun. In the third year, we
observed the participants in a scenario where the security engineering process had
progressed further. They identified the threats for a system where some security
controls have been put into place to satisfy the authorization and authentication
requirements, which are fundamental for security. The variation in the third year
is meant to provide evidence that the results obtained in the previous two years
can be generalized and could apply to systems with different degrees of elaboration
of security mechanisms.
In summary, this study concluded that STRIDE is not difficult to learn and
execute, although it is relatively time-consuming. Further, many threats go unde-
tected during the analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes this
study in the domain of requirements engineering. Section 3 provides the necessary
background information on STRIDE. Section 4 describes the planning of the study
and states the test hypotheses. Section 5 describes the execution of the study and
the measurement procedure. The results are presented in Sections 6 and 7 and
summarized in Section 8. Section 9 lists the threats to the validity of this study.
Section 10 discusses the impact of STRIDE on security requirements elicitation.
Finally, Section 11 discusses the related work and Section 12 gives the concluding
remarks.
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2 Requirements, architecture and threat analysis
As formulated by Haley et al., the essence of security goals is to protect assets
from harm [11]. At the beginning of the requirements engineering process, these
assets are high-level and often abstract, as, for instance, information about cus-
tomers’ credit cards. Harm is caused by the violation of the security concerns, like
confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability. An example of a confiden-
tiality concern is that the credit card info is shared with the seller only. In this
example, a threat could be that the credit card info is stolen by a third-party and
the corresponding security goal would be that the IT system of the seller should
protect the credit card info from being stolen. The na¨ıve example above illustrates
how threat analysis is applied on high-level assets and yields to high-level security
goals.
From these high-level protection goals, concrete security requirements are to
be derived by operationalization. As security requirements are constraints on the
functional requirements, one has to determine which security goals “apply” to
which functional requirements [11]. Next, one has to assess what weaknesses in
the functionality should be avoided by means of the constraints. That is, the
operationalization of a security goal requires that the concept of harm (i.e., the
attacker’s goal) is operationalized as well. Therefore, there is the need for a finer-
grained round of threat analysis. This exercise requires the identification of how
the abstract assets, like information, translate to tangible entities, like data and
software, and how the functionality meshes with those entities by means of co-
ordination and communication flows. This can be realistically carried out if a
decomposition of the system has emerged and cues are available about the distri-
bution of the responsibilities as well as the layout of the information flows. Only
then, in fact, it is feasible to assess the potential weaknesses that might threaten
the system. In short, some design decisions need to be taken at this stage and an
initial structure of the system needs to be shaped in order to enable the elicitation
of realistic threats and, consequently, sound security requirements. We are not
talking about a full-blown software architecture but rather about an initial step
in the solution domain that sketches the overall organization of the system. This
is a pivotal idea that shoulders this study and is substantiated by the Twin Peaks
model of Nuseibeh [29] and its extension for security by Heyman et al. [13]. The
Twin Peaks model has its origin in the requirements engineering community and
describes how no sharp separation exists between the definition (and evolution)
of requirements and architecture. The creation of these two artifacts progresses in
parallel and is heavily intertwined. Not only do requirements provide the rationale
for design decisions, but the latter are made while requirements are elaborated
and, in turn, shape the way such elaboration proceeds. This idea is nowadays ac-
cepted by the majority of the research community, both requirements engineers
and software architects [2].
To recap, the security requirements are derived by means of threat modeling,
which requires the manifestation of an initial sketch of the solution, which, in
turn, is either implicitly or explicitly available at that point of the requirements
engineering process because of the effect of the Twin Peaks. Hence, this study deals
with the threat modeling of an initial architecture like the one pictured in Figure
2. However, the context of the threat modeling technique is the elicitation of the
security requirements that will eventually drive the refinement of the initial design
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solution into a fully fledged software architecture. Incidentally, threat modeling
could be used once again in order to assess the soundness of the resulting, more
refined software architecture, although other techniques might also be preferred,
like, for instance, ATAM [6].
3 Background on threat modeling with STRIDE
STRIDE is a model-based threat modeling technique developed by Microsoft [18].
The methodology guides the security analyst through several activities, which will
be briefly discussed in the remainder of this section.
Step 1. Model the system by means of a Data Flow Diagram. The initial activities
define the scope of the analysis and produce a model of the system under review.
The Data Flow Diagram (DFD) is built during this step and is instrumental for
the elicitation of the threats later on. An example of a DFD is given in Figure
1, which is a representation of the system used in this study (see also Figure
2). Starting from the context diagram showing the users and the third parties
of the system, a more detailed decomposition, called level 1 DFD, is derived by
refinement. The level 1 DFD shows the way the information travels in the system
through data flows (DF) from external entities (EE) like system users to processing
nodes (PN) like active software components and data storage points (DS) like
database components. The hierarchical refinement can continue further down if
necessary. As reported by Dhillon, this is only required in more complex systems
and often a level 1 DFD is sufficient for the sake of the analysis [8].
During the scoping and modeling step, the analyst must also list the security
assumptions explicitly. Examples of assumptions are the presence of an authentica-
tion mechanism, or the possibility for a threat agent (a.k.a. attacker) to eavesdrop
on the communication channels. The assumptions are used later on, during the
threat elicitation step.
Step 2. Map the DFD elements to threat categories. In STRIDE, threats are organized
according to six categories:
– Spoofing (S) refers to a rogue person or program successfully impersonating
another legitimate user or program.
– Tampering (T) refers to a threat agent illegitimately modifying application
resources, such as in memory data.
– Repudiation (R) refers to a user (legitimate or malicious) able to deny the
execution of an action within the system.
– Information disclosure (I) refers to a threat agent obtaining private information
she is not supposed to access.
– Denial of service (D) refers to a threat agent making a system resource unavail-
able to its intended users.
– Elevation of privilege (E) refers to a threat agent obtaining privileged access to
resources that are normally protected.
Each element type of the DFD is susceptible to one or more of the above categories,
according to the schema illustrated in Table 1. For instance, the Consumer (EE)
in Figure 1 is prone to spoofing and repudiation while the Internal Service (PN)
is susceptible to all types of threats.
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(a) Level 0 (context diagram)
(b) Level 1
Fig. 1 A sample DFD for the digital publishing system
Table 1 The mapping of DFD elements to threat categories
DFD Applicable
elements threat categories
S T R I D E
EE X X
DF X X X
DS X X X
PN X X X X X X
Step 3. Elicit the threats. For each mapping between a generic threat category and
a DFD element type, STRIDE provides a “checklist” of concrete threats that need
to be considered. As shown in Figure 3, the checklist comes in the shape of a
tree containing a hierarchy of template threats that can be instantiated in the
context of the system under review. In the reference book describing STRIDE
[18], a catalog of 12 threat trees is provided. A tree can sometimes refer to others.
In the picture, for instance, the ‘spoofing’ tree is referenced from the ‘tampering
with a data flow’ tree. The tree-based structure is intended to ease the navigation
and to provide a better overview of the rationale behind each threat.
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Fig. 2 The digital publishing system
Fig. 3 A sample tree of template threats
The applicability of a threat depends on the assumptions stated during step
1. With reference to Figure 3, for instance, the threat concerning a man-in-the-
middle is relevant only if channel-level security (e.g., SSL) is used and should be
discarded otherwise.
Step 4. Document the threats. STRIDE does not mandate a specific format for this
step. Misuse cases are commonly used in security to document threats [38]. There-
fore, we have used the structured textual format that has been defined for misuse
cases by Sindre and Ophdal [37]. The template is very similar to those used for use
cases and includes some extra security-specific information, like, for instance, the
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so-called ‘capture points’ section. This section contains the description of how the
misuse may be prevented (or detected) and represents an opportunity to identify
the security requirements.
Tool support. When the study started, Microsoft was providing a prototype tool.
The prototype allowed the user to draw the DFD and generated a very long list
of threats (organized by the six threat categories) that the user had to prune in
light of the assumptions made for the system under analysis.
Meanwhile, the prototype has been replaced by the SDL Threat Modeling Tool,
also released by Microsoft [36]. The tool still provides a graphical DFD editor but
does not generate the list of threats anymore. It only generates the mappings
between DFD elements and threat categories (step 2).
To avoid additional confounding factors, this work did not employ any tool.
Given the evolution of the tool support, this choice proved to be successful, as our
results would have been specific to the use of a prototype not available anymore.
4 Planning the study
This section presents the design of an empirical study that observed and evalu-
ated how the participants apply the STRIDE technique to perform the security
analysis of a distributed system. In order to enable replication of this study, all
the experimental material mentioned here is also available on-line at [1].
As mentioned earlier, this study has been executed over three consecutive in-
stallments. The core part of the study has taken place during the first two years,
when the participants (41 in total) have been asked to analyze a distributed sys-
tem that is in the early phase of specification and that does not contain security
mechanisms yet. In the third year, the participants (16 in total) have analyzed
a similar system, which however contains security controls for authorization and
authentication. This change has been introduced to investigate the potential for
generalization of the results obtained during the previous two years. That is, if
the results are confirmed in the third year, their applicability could go beyond the
specific type of system used in the experimentation. For instance, the results could
apply to systems with different degrees of elaboration of their security mechanisms.
In this and the following sections we start describing the planning, execution
and results of the core part of the study, i.e., the first two years. The description
of the third year is deferred to Section 7.
4.1 Experimental object
The Digital Publishing System is a medium-scale distributed system developed
in the context of an industry-oriented research project carried out in partnership
with major news publishers in European countries [23]. The complete description
of the system is available in a technical report [42]. The main stakeholder of the
system is a news publisher (like a company publishing newspapers) transitioning
to Internet-based distribution channels. The main purpose of the system is (i) to
support the journalists and the editors during the creation and the updating of
a digital edition and (ii) to provide subscribed consumers on-line access to the
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Table 2 Teams and selected subsets of the system
Team Size Subset
1 4 Journalist & Manager
2 4 Journalist & Manager
3 4 Whole system
4 4 Whole system
5 3 Consumer & Advertiser
6 4 Consumer & Advertiser
7 4 Whole system
8 5 Journalist & Manager
9 5 Consumer & Advertiser
10 4 Journalist & Manager
editions, e.g., via e-paper terminals. A major source of revenue is represented by
the ads inserted by advertisers into each edition. In order to be competitive, the
system has to be flexible with respect to the needs of the advertisers. Therefore, the
system integrates the advertisers into its own core business processes and provides
means to personalize the ads to the consumer’s interests.
A pictorial representation of the system is given in Figure 2. At the bottom
of the figure, the Data Server node is the storage for the published edition and
for the raw material used in the creation process (see the Content Management
System), like news articles created by the desk journalists and the field reporters,
as well as the ads provided by the advertisers. This node also contains the infor-
mation concerning the subscribed consumers (see the User Management System).
The Internal Service node is the hub of the system and provides a front-end to
the Consumers via the Newspaper Service, to the stakeholders involved in the pro-
duction of the editions via the Input Management System, and to the advertisers
via the Media Advertising System. The core business of producing the editions
is orchestrated by the Publishing Platform node (top part of the figure), which
provides access to both Journalists and Managers.
We have provided the participants with sufficient documentation for under-
standing the system. The system documentation is a document of about 50 pages
containing (i) the description of the business goals behind the system, (ii) the do-
main model describing the main concepts, (iii) the description of the stakeholders
and actors (i.e., users) of the system, (iv) the functional requirements as a list of 30
use cases, (v) the UML diagrams of the software architecture. The documentation
is available on-line [1].
4.2 Participants
The participants of this study are the students of a course on “design and analysis
of software systems” taught by the experimenters, which is positioned in the first
semester of the second year of the master in computer science at our university1.
In the first two years, we have observed 41 students organized in 10 teams
of about four students. The students have been allowed to assemble the teams
themselves, which is the state of practice in most project oriented courses at our
university. The team sizes are given in the second column of Table 2. In the first
1 The name of the university has been omitted because of the double-blind review process.
10 Riccardo Scandariato et al.
year we had 23 students divided in 6 teams. In the second year we had 18 students
divided in 4 teams.
The course is optional in the curriculum and, hence, the students tend to be
very motivated, as they selected the course because of a specific interest in the
subject. This is also indicated by the average grade of 14 out of 20 points obtained
by the teams that participated in this study in the first two years.
Concerning the background of the participants, they can be regarded as a
rather homogeneous group. Although we have not administered a specific ques-
tionnaire to validate this assumption, we know from the demographics that the
participants have the same age, nationality and study background. Regarding the
latter, the course that hosted the study is available for selection to one master
program only. This program requires the students to acquire 120 credits in order
to graduate and they are free to choose specializing courses for a maximum of 19
credits only, which is a negligible variation. Prior to the enrollment in the study,
the students have followed a course on software requirements (focusing on domain
models and use cases) and a prerequisite course on the design of software archi-
tectures. Also, the students have followed an introductory course on system and
network security. Some have followed a course on software security.
4.3 Task
The participants have been requested to perform the STRIDE analysis of the dig-
ital publishing system according to the four steps described in Section 3. They
had to use the catalog of threat trees contained in [18]. They had to consider
both insider threats (e.g., from legitimate users) and outsider threats (e.g., from
a competitor). As part of the process of documenting the threats as misuse cases,
the participants have been asked to define some ‘capture points’, i.e., security re-
quirements that are meant to prevent (or monitor) the occurrence of a threat. The
identification of these requirements was instrumental for a later stage of the course.
As this study focuses on STRIDE and the identification of anti-requirements, the
analysis of the security requirements is not in scope. However, a description of the
identified security requirements is given in Section 10.
The digital publishing system is used throughout the course, also outside the
scope of the study reported here. Therefore, its size is intentionally meant to be
challenging for the students. However, the size of the STRIDE analysis grows
rapidly with the size of the system under analysis. Therefore, we advised the
participants to select a smaller subset of the whole system to focus on. As a
guideline, they have been told to take the viewpoint of a group of system users
and pick a coherent subset containing a sufficient number of key use cases that
are relevant to that group. The individual choices of the teams are reported in the
third column of Table 2 and fall into one of the following options:
– Consumer and Advertiser. This is a slice of the system containing the use cases
that are relevant to the external users
– Journalist and Manager. This is the slice representing the perspective of the
internal users
– Whole system. Some participants opted for a broader analysis.
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Table 3 Terminology
Term Meaning
True positive (TP) Correct threat
False negative (FN) Overlooked threat
False positive (FP) Incorrect threat
Precision (P) Percentage of the produced threats
that are correct (the higher the better)
Recall (R) Percentage of the existing threats that
are discovered (the higher the better)
As the system under analysis in the first two years does not contain security
controls, the participants had to keep in mind the following standard assump-
tions: a) there are no authentication and authorization mechanisms in place, b) no
logging is implemented and c) the communication links are unencrypted. These
assumptions are important to judge whether a potential threat is indeed applica-
ble to the system under analysis. For instance, all threats related to weaknesses in
the crypto protocols become irrelevant under the above assumptions and must be
discarded.
The participants were allowed to make additional assumptions, provided that
these were properly documented. It happened only in two cases. One team assumed
that the storage capacity of the data store is unlimited, which further reduces the
number of applicable threats (e.g., for denial of service). Another team assumed
that the data storage infrastructure was shared with other systems and hence
more threats had to be considered (for information disclosure). As risk assessment
is not a part of the course, the teams have not been judged on the nature of their
assumptions as long as they could properly justify their choices by showing that
they were reasonable.
Concerning the creation of the level 1 data flow diagram, during the STRIDE
lecture the participants have been taught to use the deployment diagram (exem-
plified in Figure 2) as a guideline. This diagram is central as the distribution of the
system over several networked nodes is a key aspect from a security perspective.
The participants have been taught to map nodes of the deployment diagram to
processing nodes (PN) in the DFD and actors to external entities (EE). According
to their choice, the teams marked the obtained DFD with a closed line identifying
the slice of the system they intended to analyze. Some teams made a distinction
between production data (news and ads) and consumer information. Consequently,
they included two different data stores in the DFD (as in Figure 1).
4.4 Design of the study
The teams carried out the same task (described above) on the same experimental
object (the digital publishing system).
4.5 Hypotheses
Research Question 1. Concerning the productivity, we do not formulate a test hy-
pothesis as we have no a-priory expectations about what the outcome should look
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like. We define the productivity as the number of correct results (i.e., the true
positives) per unit of time. Note that we do not include incorrect results in the
definition intentionally.
As mentioned in Table 3, we define a true positive (TP) as a discovered threat
that meets the following three criteria:
a) it is relevant because it can be clearly related to a leaf of a threat tree,
b) it is applicable in light of the security assumptions, and
c) its description, as given by the team, is realistic from a security perspective.
In summary, the true positives represent the amount of work (effort) correctly
carried out by a team.
To further characterize the STRIDE technique, we also measure its difficulty as
it is perceived by the participants. This has been done by means of a questionnaire.
Research Question 2. Concerning the correctness, as alternative hypothesis we are
interested in knowing whether, on average, the number of correct results is pre-
dominant (more than 80%) w.r.t. the overall number of results produced (both
correct and incorrect). As mentioned before, the true positives represent the cor-
rect results. Incorrect results are the false positives (FP), i.e., the threats that are
reported by the team and do not meet the criteria listed above. Consequently, we
defined the following null-hypothesis:
HP0 : µ{P , TP/(TP + FP )} ≤ 0.8 (1)
The quantity used in the null-hypothesis is commonly known as precision in infor-
mation retrieval terminology. Although the choice of a 80% threshold is somewhat
arbitrary, this is often regarded as a good reference for precision, e.g., in the in-
formation retrieval community.
Research Question 3. Concerning completeness, as alternative hypothesis we were
interested in knowing whether, on average, the number of correct results covers
enough (more than 80%) of the space of actual threats (both correct and over-
looked). Overlooked threats are the false negatives (FN), i.e., the number of threats
that the team failed to identify although they are relevant in the system under
analysis. Therefore, we defined the following null-hypothesis:
HR0 : µ{R , TP/(TP + FN)} ≤ 0.8 (2)
The quantity used in the null-hypothesis corresponds to the so-called recall. The
80% threshold is chosen according to the same rationale as before.
5 Operation of the study
5.1 Preparation of the participants
The participants received their training as part of the course. The course syllabus,
material and structure did not change over the years. Furthermore, the course was
taught by the same lecturers and teaching assistants
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The course focuses on the analysis of software architectures. It is organized
into three parts: a) specification of the system’s security anti-requirements as a set
of misuse cases and identification of the corresponding security requirements, b)
system refinement by selecting architecture-level security solutions, and c) valida-
tion of the overall system vis-a-vis a larger set of quality requirements by means
of trade-offs analysis. Each part comprises a set of theoretical lectures followed by
a practical lab session where the students work in teams. The study is located in
the context of the first part of the course, which comprises 3 lectures of 2.5 hours
and 1 lab session of 4 hours.
At the beginning of the 3 lectures, the students get a brief recap about use
cases and software architecture. Afterward, the lectures move on to the definition of
security requirements and the security analysis of a software system. The STRIDE
methodology is covered in depth and extensively illustrated by means of a complete
and realistic example from the e-health application domain. In the lectures, the
experimental object used in the lab session is also introduced. The class material
is available on-line [1]. The amount of training is higher than the standard at
Microsoft, where it is reported that “most practitioners have at most 2 hours of
threat modeling training” [35].
The students are very motivated to execute the projects duly, as their final
grade is heavily based on these (about 50%). The amount of work required to
complete the project is intentionally more than what the teams can achieve during
the lab time. Indeed, the assigned task is of a rather realistic size and certainly
not a “toy example”. Therefore, the students are expected to get started during
the four lab hours and then complete the assignment (and compile the report)
as homework. As the teams also work outside the supervised lab hours, we have
asked them to track the time they spend on the project. The authors are confident
that the teams reported the time earnestly, which is confirmed by the congruence
between the declared time and the work described in their reports.
5.2 Execution of the study
The teams started working on the task during the first lab of the course and then
had about ten days to complete the task at home and to turn in their report by a
given deadline.
The lab hours have been supervised by a teaching assistant and a lecturer.
During the lab hours, each team had access to an Internet-connected personal
computer with a graphical modeling tool to draw the data flow diagrams and an
office suite for editing the misuse cases. However, the teams were allowed to work
on paper if they preferred. Indeed, the teams mostly worked on paper during the
brainstorming in the lab and produced a digital report later on.
As mentioned earlier, the digital publishing system has been previously intro-
duced during the lectures. The detailed documentation has been made available a
few days before the lab session, so that the participants could further familiarize
themselves with the experimental object. The participants have been advised to
download and read the documentation before coming to the lab. The assignment,
containing the detailed description of the task, was made available at the beginning
of the lab session. It is now available on-line at [1].
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Each report contained a picture representing the analyzed level 1 DFD (and
the slice they selected), a list containing the assumptions made (with comments
about the rationale), a table for the mappings between DFD elements and threat
categories, and the misuse cases (organized by threat category) documenting the
identified threats.
The teams also had to turn in a sheet reporting the effort time (in hours) spent
on each step of the task. The time sheets have been kept on a team-wise basis,
i.e., each group reported the person hours jointly spent by the team on each step.
Further, at the end of the study all participants had to fill in a short question-
naire containing four questions. Each question asks to rate the difficulty of one of
the four steps mentioned in Section 3, on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very
hard). The questionnaire does not identify the participant except for her team
membership.
5.3 Measurement procedure
The effort time is collected from the time sheets, which have been informally
checked (sometimes also during the exam) for congruence with respect to the
amount of work visible in the reports. From the questionnaires we collected the
opinion of the participants about the perceived difficulty of the activities.
The reports turned in by the teams have been assessed by two security experts
(the first and the second author) independently. First, the experts met to decide
which threats (of the catalog) were applicable given the nature of the system under
analysis and the assumptions mentioned in Section 4.3. Then they processed the
reports. In particular, the experts counted the number of correct threats (true
positives) and incorrect threats (false positives) according to the definitions given
in Section 4.5. The experts compared their results and, in case of mismatches, they
discussed until a consensus was reached. This happened in a very small number
of cases (less than 4% of the 260 threats reviewed).
The experts also measured the size of the DFD used by each team by looking
at the corresponding picture included in the report. They counted the number of
instances in each element type (process nodes, data flows, and so on).
Given the set of threats in the catalog (as decided earlier) and the DFD, the
experts computed the total number of applicable threats per each team. This
number (called the baseline) represents an idealistic result that could be obtained
by exhaustively analyzing each element in the DFD. In this sense, it represents an
upper bound. However, in order to avoid a repetitive listing, all teams leveraged a
technique called reduction, which is suggested in the documentation of STRIDE:
“You can apply a process called reduction to reduce the number of
entities you will analyze. In short, if you have two or more DFD elements
of the same type [. . . ] you can model the elements as one entity [. . . ]. In
other words, when you analyze the threats to one of the elements, that
same analysis applies to the other element also [18].”
For instance, if a team mentioned that a certain data flow was subject to an
eavesdropping threat, the same threat was not repeated anymore for the rest of
the data flows. In a nutshell, via reduction the teams set out to exemplify all the
different threats that were applicable in the system under analysis, rather than
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providing an exhaustive list. This attitude has been endorsed by the instructors
of the course and it is also accounted for in the measurement procedure.
In fact, in light of reduction, the baseline is not a faithful representative of
the size of the task that the teams set out to accomplish. Consequently, it cannot
be used as a yard stick to measure the overlooked threats. Therefore, the experts
counted the false negatives as the number of applicable leaf nodes in the catalog
of threat trees that have not been exemplified in each report2. This is more in line
with the way the teams executed the task. As before, the counting of the false
negatives has been done independently by the experts and the few issues resolved
by consensus.
6 Results
In this section, we first present some descriptive statistics and then address the
three research questions. All measurements used in this paper are available on-line
at [1].
6.1 Descriptive statistics
DFD. The DFD produced by the teams were correct. Hence, no influence in the
results can be traced back to any erroneous or incomplete DFD modeling. The
size of the Data Flow Diagram used by each team is presented in Table 4. The
total number of DFD elements is given, together with a more detailed breakdown
of the number of processes (PN), data stores (DS), external entities (EE) and data
flows (DF). It can be noted that the teams can be divided in two groups: DFDs of
about 24 elements (models for the whole system) and of about 10 elements (other
subsets). The average size of the DFDs is 14.3 elements (standard deviation is
6.90) and the 95% confidence interval is [10, 18.5] elements (one-sample Wilcoxon
test). Note that this DFD size falls within the range of real-world systems analyzed
by practitioners as reported by Dhillon [8].
The data flows are the biggest contributors to the overall DFD size (see the
means in Table 4). Indeed, there is a strong correlation between the size of the
DFD and the number of data flows (Spearman ρ = 0.997, p < 0.05).
Baseline. We recall that the baseline represents the upper bound to the number
of threats that can be discovered. The average size of the baseline is 214 threats
(standard deviation is 92), which is extremely large and possibly unmanageable.
The confidence interval is [152.5, 274.5] threats (one-sample Wilcoxon test).
Figure 4 shows the composition of the baseline over the six threat categories.
The tampering (T), information disclosure (I) and denial of service (D) threats
are, on average, much higher than the others and these differences are statistically
significant (paired samples Wilcoxon test). Further, the analysis of the correlation
(Spearman, p < 0.05) between the overall count of threats in the baseline and its
individual components reveal that the strongest values are obtained for T (ρ =
0.988), I (1.0) and D (0.986). This is in line with the fact that the T-I-D categories
2 Of course, the extra assumptions made by the teams have been considered.
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Table 4 Size of the DFD
Team PN DS EE DF Total
1 2 1 1 7 11
2 2 1 1 6 10
3 2 2 5 17 26
4 2 1 5 15 23
5 1 1 2 6 10
6 2 1 1 6 10
7 3 1 5 14 23
8 3 1 1 8 13
9 1 1 1 4 7
10 2 1 1 6 10
µ 2.0 1.1 2.3 8.9 14.3
σ 0.67 0.32 1.89 4.61 6.90
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Fig. 4 Size of the baseline by threat category
are mapped more often to the DFD elements than the other categories, as visible in
Table 1. More mappings mean more checklists to apply. Additionally, the checklists
for these categories contain more threats.
In conclusion, it appears that STRIDE has a tendency to produce a potentially
overwhelming number of threats (unless reduction is used) and to deepen the
analysis in three threat categories.
6.2 Research Question 1: Productivity and difficulty
Effort time. The average time spent by the teams on the task is 25.1 hours (stan-
dard deviation is 6.6) and the confidence interval is [19, 30] hours (one-sample
Wilcoxon test).
In Figure 5, the time is broken down into the different steps of STRIDE men-
tioned in Section 3: (1) creating the DFD, (2) mapping the DFD elements to
the threat categories, (3) eliciting the threats, and (4) documenting the identi-
fied threats. It is interesting to note that, on average, the same amount of time
is spent on finding the threats (steps 1-2-3 together) and documenting them as
misuse cases (paired samples Wilcoxon test).
It is not possible to link the effort time to the size of the DFD and of the
baseline. Therefore, there is no proportion between the time put into the exercise
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Fig. 6 Prediction model for the overall time
and the real size of the chosen subset. This possibly relates to the way of working
of the participants, which used the reduction technique, as explained in Section
5.3.
As shown in Figure 6, an accurate model can be built (R-squared=0.88, F-
statistic<.05) to predict the overall time spent on analyzing the system (steps 1
to 4 together) from the observation of the preliminary, smaller work done in the
mapping step (step 2). The model has been built by means of the LTS robust re-
gression technique. Replica studies should consider investigating this point further,
e.g., by means of specific questions to the participants.
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Table 5 Threats by team: true positives, false negatives and false positives
Team TP FN FP
1 18 44 3
2 13 47 2
3 15 45 4
4 22 38 6
5 15 45 2
6 38 22 5
7 13 48 4
8 16 44 1
9 53 2 15
10 8 52 7
µ 21.1 38.7 4.9
σ 13.8 15.3 4.0
C.I. [14.0, 64.5] [23.5, 48] [2.5, 8.5]
Effort. In theory, the effort (work done) would be the sum of both the true positives
and the false positives. However, we want to assess the productivity with respect to
the work correctly done. Therefore, we count only the true positives in the measure
of the effort.
Figure 7 (white box) presents the boxplot for the TPs. Table 5 reports the
raw numbers used to build Figure 7. The average number of TPs is 21.1 threats
(standard deviation of 13.8) and the confidence interval is [14.0, 64.5] threats (one-
sample Wilcoxon test). Figure 8 presents the TPs arranged by threat categories
(white bars). The statistical analysis (paired samples Wilcoxon test) reveals that
there are no differences within the categories in the T-I-D group as well as within
the S-R-E group. This can be appreciated also visually by looking at the white
bars in Figure 8. Further, there is a statistically significant location shift between
the average number of TPs of any of the T-I-D categories and any of the S-R-
E categories. Therefore, there is more focus on T-I-D threats and less on S-R-E
threats. This is in line with the findings for the baseline.
The TPs are not correlated to the the size of the DFD (nor of the baseline).
More interestingly, the TPs cannot be linked to the time. This may imply that, for
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our sample, investing more time on the analysis does not guarantee an improve-
ment.
Productivity. Having characterized the effort time and the true positives, we can
eventually provide an answer to the first research question. Considering only the
time spent in identifying (and not documenting) the threats, an average produc-
tivity of 1.8 threats per hour (standard deviation of 1.5) is to be expected for a
system similar to the analyzed one. The confidence interval is [0.94, 3.25] threats
per hour (one-sample Wilcoxon test). That is, it takes an average of 33 minutes
to identify a correct threat.
Considering the overall time (i.e., including the time spent documenting the
threats as misuse cases), the average productivity drops to 0.9 threats per hour
with a confidence interval of [0.48, 1.33].
Disregarding the time spent building the DFD (which is a one-time, upfront
exercise), and including the time spent documenting the threats, the average pro-
ductivity is of 1.2 threats per hour with a confidence interval of [0.64, 1.81].
Considering the baselines as an upper bound, at this rate and with a single
analyst, it would take up to 7 working days to complete the analysis of the smallest
DFD in our study, and up to 26 working days for the largest. These values are
obtained by multiplying the average productivity by the size of the baselines.
Perceived difficulty. The perceived difficulty is obtained by analyzing the answers to
the questionnaire, which contains one question per step of the STRIDE method-
ology. The respondent is asked to rate the difficulty of each step on an ordinal
scale from one (very easy) to five (very difficult). Table 6 provides the number of
respondents, the medians of the answers and the confidence intervals (Wilcoxon).
On average, the first two steps of the methodology are perceived as “easy”
(2) by the participants, while the last two are perceived as being of “normal”
(3) difficulty. The location shift between the first two steps and the last two is
statistically significant (Wilcoxon paired samples, significance level of 0.0125 with
the Bonferroni correction). Overall, it is quite remarkable that participants that
have no prior practical experience with applying the STRIDE methodology find
that it is not hard to work with it. This confidence testifies in favor of the very
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Table 6 Reported difficulty per step
Step Answers Median
difficulty
Conf.
interval
1. Model the system and list the assumptions 39 2 [2, 2.5]
2. Map DFD elements to threat categories 39 2 [1.5, 2]
3. Elicit threats via threat tree patterns 39 3 [2.5, 3]
4. Document the threats as misuse cases 40 3 [3, 3.5]
structured approach adopted by STRIDE and the good level of guidance provided
by the existing documentation. In summary, the participants are not overwhelmed
by the material, following the steps is not difficult, and the threat trees simplify
the life of the novice analysts. Possibly, this is a common trait of checklist-based
threat modeling approaches. However, more experimentation is needed to support
this point.
On the other hand, the questionnaire suggests that the participants do not
have a correct perception of the large amount of threats that, on average, they
let go missing (false positives). This impression has been confirmed during the
discussion of the results with the students at the final exams. However, a replica
of this study should consider asking more direct questions on this matter, e.g., by
letting the participants rate their perceived level of task completion. Nevertheless,
the results of this study suggest that the training should particularly stress the
issue of the false negatives (overlooked threats) in order to avoid over-confidence
in the analysis.
We also computed the team-wise median difficulty per step and investigated the
relationships with the other measures. We found a significantly strong correlation
(Spearman ρ = 0.81, p < 0.05) between the median difficulty in step 3 (threats
elicitation) and the number of correct threats (TP) elicited. This could mean that
a greater awareness of the real difficulty of the task leads to better results.
6.3 Research Question 2: Correctness of the analysis results
As shown in Figure 7 (dark gray box), we observed many more correct results (TP)
than incorrect results (FP) and the location shift is statistically significant (paired
samples Wilcoxon test, significance level of 0.025 with the Bonferroni correction).
The average for FPs is 4.9 threats and the standard deviation is 4.0. The confidence
interval is [2.5, 8.5] threats (one-sample Wilcoxon test).
With reference to the null hypothesis HP0 of Equation 1, the average precision
is 0.81 with a standard deviation of 0.11. This value is slightly better than the
threshold used in the equation. However, the one-tailed Wilcoxon test asserts that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (p > 0.05). Therefore, from a statistical
perspective, we conclude that the number of incorrect results is not small with
respect to the results produced. Nonetheless, we remark that the statistical test
would have succeeded with a slightly lower threshold of 75%. In summary, the
amount of incorrect results is not particularly concerning.
Considering Figure 8 (dark gray bars), we can observe that there are less FPs
than TPs in all categories, except for repudiation (R). In this latter case, there
is no statistically significant difference and hence we can conclude that in the
R category there are, on average, as many correct results as incorrect threats.
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Further, it also appears that on average there are more errors in the R category,
while the other categories are about the same. This is confirmed by the statistical
test in most cases (paired samples Wilcoxon test). Possibly, our study suggests
that the training of STRIDE analysts should pay particular attention to creating
awareness about the repudiation threats.
We have analyzed the false positives in the reports, in search for reoccurring
mistakes. Our analysis focused on the repudiation (R) category, which totals the
largest amount of false positives. The most common mistakes are due to the teams
reporting unrealistic threats that are not grounded in the reality of the system
under analysis and whose feasibility is not demonstrated by the course of action
described in the threat scenarios. In fact, often these erroneous threats are too
vague and their scenario description is not specific enough in order to assess its
correctness according to the criteria listed in Section 4.5. We believe this is a
symptom of the lack of understanding of this threat category on the participants’
side. Many other errors were due to the failing at determining that certain items
in the threat catalog were not applicable to the system under analysis (e.g., the
threats related to logging). This was caused by a wrong interpretation of the
security assumptions.
6.4 Research Question 3: Completeness of the analysis results
The investigation of the false negatives brings out a different story. As shown in
Figure 7 (light gray box), we observed many more overlooked threats (FN) than
correct results (TP). However, the difference is not statistically significant (paired
samples Wilcoxon test, significance level of 0.025 with the Bonferroni correction).
Significance is not achieved due to the presence of outliers, which are symbolized
by small circles in the figure. In fact, if the outlier with the smallest value is
removed (team 9, 2 false negatives in total), the difference becomes statistically
significant. The average number of FNs is 38.7 threats and the standard deviation
is 15.3. The confidence interval is [23.5, 48] threats (one-sample Wilcoxon test).
With reference to the null hypothesis HR0 of Equation 2, the average recall
is 0.36 with a standard deviation of 0.25. This value is uncomfortably low when
compared to the expectation of 80%. The one-tailed Wilcoxon test confirms that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (p > 0.05) and therefore the number of
correct results does not cover adequately the space of actual threats, as the number
of overlooked threats is too high.
With reference to Figure 8 (light gray bars), we can observe that the false
negatives in the repudiation (R) and elevation of privilege (E) are about the same.
All the other averages are different from each other, as confirmed by the statistical
test (paired samples Wilcoxon test). The denial-of-service category (D) presents
the highest number of overlooked threats, which are almost three times as many
as the correct results in that category. Possibly, this suggests an attention point
for the training of STRIDE analysts.
We have looked into the reports of the teams in order to identify patterns in the
false negatives for two categories: information disclosure (I) and denial of service
(D). These categories account for the largest number of false negatives. We have
not seen any recurring threat that is forgotten by the participants. Rather, we got
the impression that the teams were overwhelmed by the sheer amount of threats
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that are applicable in this categories. The threat trees are indeed very reach, with
as many as 16 leaf nodes for information disclosure and 20 for denial of service,
including the references to other trees.
7 Towards a generalization of the results
The results presented so far are obtained for a software system that includes virtu-
ally no security-specific mechanisms, which could represent, for instance, an early
stage of the development where the security requirements have not been elaborated
upon yet. With the aim at generalizing the results, we replicated the study for a
third consecutive year. This time, the digital publishing system has been extended
by the teams to include security mechanisms for authentication and authoriza-
tion. Subsequently, the teams have applied the STRIDE technique as described
before. This case corresponds, for instance, to a more advanced stage of the devel-
opment life cycle where some important security requirements have already been
elicited and consequently implemented. If confirmed, the results could then apply
to systems with different degrees of elaboration of their security concerns.
We observed 16 participants organized in four teams of four students each.
Clearly, we have no ambition to draw statistically significant conclusions given the
limited sample size. As in the previous years, the participants have shown a good
level of motivation and commitment as corroborated by the average final grade of
15.75 out of 20 obtained by the teams.
Concerning the planning and operation of the third year of the study, the same
procedures described in Sections 4 and 5 have been applied. This also includes the
measurement protocol described in Section 5.3. However, the reports have been
reviewed by only one of the two experts in the third year.
7.1 Observations
On average, the teams modeled the system with a much larger DFD compared
to the previous years (47.25 elements vs 14.3). Also the median of the reported
difficulty of building the DFD (step 1) is higher (“hard” vs “easy”) and the differ-
ence is statistically significant. The median difficulty for step 2 (mapping) stays
“easy”. Conversely, the median difficulty for both the threat elicitation and docu-
mentation steps appear to be easier (“easy” vs “normal”). The participants spent
on average 73.75 hours on the task (+194%) and about two thirds of the time is
spent in identifying threats (before, there was a balance between identifying and
documenting threats).
We report that the productivity went down to 0.5 threats per hour (from 1.8),
although the difference is not statistically significant. The precision went slightly
down (from 0.81 to 0.76) and recall deteriorated as well (from 0.36 to 0.31).
In summary, the replica of the study on a system having more security mech-
anisms confirmed the results obtained in the previous years as far as the research
questions 2 (correctness) and 3 (completeness) are concerned, although the higher
complexity of the analyzed system might have caused a lower productivity (re-
search question 1).
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8 Summary of the findings
In summary, this study observed that, in our sample:
1. The STRIDE technique is not perceived as difficult but, with an average pro-
ductivity of 1.8 threats per hour at best, the time cost is relatively large.
2. The average number of incorrect threats is low and corresponds to the 19-24%
of the total amount of produced threats.
3. The average number of overlooked threats is very high and corresponds to the
64-69% of the total amount of threats.
Despite the limitations of this study discussed in Section 9, these observations
might be of use to software managers (to budget the effort for a security analysis),
to customers of security consultants (to understand the level of trust that can be
granted to the results) and to instructors (to understand the learning curve and
the attention points of the training).
9 Threats to validity
In the category of threats to the construct validity, mono-operation bias is to be
mentioned. Indeed, we used only one object in our study and the cause construct
could be under-represented.
Concerning the conclusion validity, the time each team spent on the task is
reported by the participants themselves. To prevent this threat, we kept reminding
the participants to track the time they were spending on the assignment. We do
not deem this threat harmful to the validity of the study. In fact, the time sheets
appeared congruent with the work documented by the students in their project
reports. An additional threat is represented by the mistakes that the experts might
have done during the assessments of the reports. This threat has been mitigated
in the first two years of the study by employing two experts. The authors are
confident that no major errors have been done in this respect.
Concerning the internal validity, maturation of the participants has to be high-
lighted. Possibly, the participants could have become tired because of the size of
the task. Another threat to the internal validity is the participants increasing un-
derstanding of the digital publishing system. The experimenters tried to minimize
this learning effect by introducing the system during the lectures and by providing
the documentation of the system before the lab started. Also, the participants
might have shared their work between teams, also from one year to another. How-
ever, we did not detect any case of plagiarism and using the same experimental
object across the years was central to this study, as the sample size is not sufficient
to investigate multiple factors.
Finally, three threats to the external validity need to be mentioned. The main
issue threatening the generalization of the results concerns the use of master stu-
dents instead of professionals. The matter of using students in empirical studies is
still controversial. However, some studies have shown that students perform com-
parably to professional in certain tasks like requirements selection [39], or lead
time estimation [17]. Some studies have also observed that master students (like
in our study) perform more realistically than freshmen [32], and that students
working in a project (like in our study) are to be preferred over students working
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in a classroom [3]. In any case, the use of students is advised in exploratory studies
like ours [40,4]. Second, we used teams of three to five students. The results might
not generalize to the case of a single analyst. However, we remark that letting
many analysts sound-board during the threat modeling of a system is commonly
advised by the state of the art [34]. Third, the results might be influenced by the
experimental object used in this study. For instance the results might not apply
to other application domains or to systems of different size and complexity.
10 Discussion
As mentioned in Section 7, in the third-year installment of the study the par-
ticipants went through two phases. First they identified the authentication and
authorization requirements of the system. This activity has been carried out using
the framework of Haley et al. [11], which is referred in Section 2. These require-
ments have been used to extend the system with basic security controls. In a
second phase, the extended system has been analyzed by means of STRIDE in
order to identify the threats, which have been documented as misuse cases. As
mentioned in Section 3, the documentation of the misuse cases contain a section
(called ‘capture points’) that the teams have been instructed to use as a means to
describe the security requirements that could prevent the corresponding threats.
Therefore, the teams engaged in the identification of security requirements
both before and after the STRIDE analysis had been performed. This provides
the opportunity to appreciate whether the use of STRIDE influenced the way the
participants addressed the requirements engineering activity. Of course, the re-
quirements identified before the STRIDE analysis are more limited in scope, as
the participants looked into authorization and authentication only. To compen-
sate, we restricted the comparison to the requirements that are clearly related to
either authentication or authorization concerns. Given the small number of teams
observed and the loose control of the factors, we can only draw some preliminary
observations and do not imply that our intuitions have a general applicability.
Nevertheless, the observations in this section are an interesting starting point and
call for further investigation by means of a full-scale controlled experiment.
10.1 Security requirements identified before STRIDE
First and foremost, all teams neglected the authentication requirements in spite of
being explicitly requested to deal with such concern. The teams simply postulated
that some form of authentication was in place, without going deeper in that re-
spect. The security requirements they produced predicate over roles like customers
and advertisers, which correspond to the actors mentioned in the documentation
(e.g., the use cases). However, how the individuals should be dependably mapped
to the system roles is never discussed. For instance, none of the teams has de-
fined what an ‘authenticated customer’ is. Therefore, a number of issues related
to identity management have been overlooked, including the life-cycle of users’
credentials. In summary, the teams have been very superficial for what concerns
the authentication requirements.
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Concerning authorization, the teams identified the security constraints as role-
based access control rules with respect to the system assets. They focused mostly
on information assets, like a news story or a newspaper edition, and much less on
resources, like services and service requests, which can also be the cause of security
issues. Further, the access control rules often referred to generic operations like
create, request, and update. Incidentally, the deletion of information was never
present in the authorization requirements, although this is a relevant concern in the
system at hand. Furthermore, when system functionality was mentioned, the teams
manifested a very idealistic attitude. They did not consider the possibility that the
functionality might be exploited to circumvent the authorization constraints, for
instance, because of a faulty implementation. Therefore, the teams did not foresee
any ‘backup plan’ for the case of a failing authorization requirement.
10.2 Security requirements identified after STRIDE
Concerning authentication, the teams adopted a multi-lateral perspective and of-
ten considered the problem of authenticating the system to the customers, e.g.,
to avoid scams. Previously, the teams had only considered the concern of au-
thenticating the users to the system. The teams have also been more thorough
in their requirements. They included constraints about the authentication pro-
cedures, e.g., requiring the use of hard-to-guess credentials. They systematically
thought to protecting the transmission of credentials-related material by means of
secure channels. They stated time constraints over the authentication sessions (so
that sessions time out eventually) in order to limit the risk of identity imperson-
ation. They even came up with the proposal of monitoring the login requests in
order to identify any suspicious activity, like an attacker trying to guess a user’s
credential.
Concerning the authorization requirements, we observed a more balanced mix
of assets, which included information as well as services and service requests.
The teams also systematically applied the principle of using multiple layers of
security. For instance, they required the presence of either auditing, to deter the
circumvention of the authorization constraints, or input validation, to prevent the
misuse of faulty functionality. Similarly, some teams required the use of encryption
to protect the stored data, in order to protect the information assets from the
prying eyes of an insider that bypasses the authorization constraints (e.g., by
means of a side channel).
In conclusion, the teams identified more accurate security requirements after
having performed the STRIDE analysis. However, this benefit came at the cost of a
perspective that is too low-level at times. For instance, sometimes the requirements
refer to data stores rather than information. This appears as a bias due to the use
of data flow diagrams in STRIDE. Similarly, some requirements are borderline to
being design decisions. For instance, the use of input validation could be considered
a rather solution-oriented technique.
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11 Related work
11.1 Evaluation of STRIDE
McGraw has performed a study of the software security initiatives at 51 well-known
companies [26]. The study resulted in the creation of the so-called BSIMMmodel of
the most important security activities that are enforced by the software industry to
date. In the author’s words, the BSIMM model is a “descriptive model of software
security”. With reference to thread modeling, it has been observed that 35 firms
perform a risk-driven architectural design review. Although the study does not
comment on STRIDE directly, it provides material evidence about the relevance
of this technique.
Microsoft has never published any figure related to the effectiveness of STRIDE,
although the technique is often accounted for improving the quality of it products.
Shostack, head of the SDL threat modeling unit, has published an experience re-
port explaining the evolution of the technique, discussing some issues encountered
over the years and highlighting the directions of future improvement [35].
Dhillon has criticized STRIDE openly and compared it to an alternative tech-
nique that has been developed in-house [8]. The main remark is about the fact that
STRIDE is time-consuming because it proceeds by analyzing the DFD element-
by-element. His remarks are in line with the relatively low productivity observed in
this study. The author describes an alternative technique that also leverages DFD
models. The DFD is annotated with extra information, like the programming lan-
guage used to develop the components or the dataflow’s type (HTTP, SQL, and
so on). This information is used to identify specific patterns of interaction in the
DFD that might lead to weaknesses. Such identification is driven by a library of
35 data flow diagram patterns. For instance, a pattern might be a process node
that provides a web interface. In this case, the cross-site scripting and the cross-
site request forgery threats must be considered. Citing 30 industrial projects, the
author reports that this technique is as effective as STRIDE concerning the identi-
fication of the threats, and is more time-efficient. However, no supporting evidence
is provided as the comparison is only anecdotal.
11.2 Evaluation of other threat modeling techniques
Although no empirical evaluation of STRIDE has been performed so far, some
competing threat and risk modeling techniques have been put to the test of ex-
periments.
Misuse cases are a well-known threat modeling technique that is based on the
description of the system functionality via use cases and involves the brainstorming
of security experts [38]. Differently from STRIDE, the analysis process does not
adopt checklists of potential threats. Via creative thinking, the experts analyze
each functionality in the use case diagram and identify ways of harming the system
by means of mis-functionality.
Threat modeling via misuse cases has been tested in a series of three experi-
ments. Opdahl and Sindre compared misuse cases to attack trees, which represent
another well-known technique also involving out-of-the-box thinking and based
on brainstorming by security experts [30]. The experiment involved 63 students
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and the results show that attack trees might lead to a higher number of identified
threats. However, the study did not assess the correctness and relevance of the
produced threats. The participants did not show any difference with respect to
the preference of misuse cases over attack trees. Karpati et al. compared misuse
cases to mal-activity diagrams, a technique to model social engineering threats in
business processes [22]. The study involved 75 students and found no significant
differences between the two techniques, except for a preference of mis-activity di-
agrams with respect to the ease of use. Karpati et al. compared misuse cases to
misuse case maps, a technique that extends the notation of misuse cases and re-
late them to the architectural structure of the system [21]. The study involved 33
students and found that there is no difference in the amount of identified threats.
Further misuse case maps have been perceived as more difficult to learn by the
participants. However, misuse case maps helped identifying significantly more mit-
igations.
Diallo et al. assessed common criteria, misuse cases and attack trees by means
of a comparative evaluation [9]. The authors applied the three techniques to the
same object and performed an evaluation according to the following dimensions:
ease of learning, usability and quality of the results. Despite the limitations of this
type of setup, the authors observed that common criteria are hard to learn and
use. Both misuse cases and attack tree are easier in this respect, with an advantage
of attack trees when it comes to interpreting and analyzing the results.
Meland et al. reported that, in their own experience, threat modeling based on
misuse cases is a time consuming and complex task [27]. The authors suggested
an improvement of the technique based on the use of libraries of reusable threat
models. In practice, they proposed to structure the analysis process by adopting
checklists. They set up an experiment with 7 professionals to test the efficacy
of two alternative libraries. One is based on the reuse of complete misuse case
diagrams. The other library is based on the reuse of misuse case stubs, which are
organized according to the STRIDE categories. The reader will notice that the
latter case bears some similarities to the threat tree patterns used in our study.
The authors observed no difference in neither the amount nor the type of threats
discovered with the two alternatives. Also, the participants were not particularly
opinioned about preferring one alternative over the other.
Hogganvik et al. have investigated the role of graphical models by means of
a series user studies [15,16,14]. The objective was to define an optimal represen-
tation for the risk diagrams that are produced by the CORAS risk and threat
analysis technique. In particular, they focused on the comprehensibility aspects
and demonstrated that the CORAS notation provides advantages over UML, be-
cause it uses more intuitive icons and is augmented with text labels.
12 Conclusions
This paper presented an evaluation of the STRIDE threat modeling technique
by means of a study that spanned three years. As summarized in Section 8, the
paper has drawn conclusions on the process oriented aspects related to applying
the technique. The paper has also characterized the quality of the analysis results
in terms of correctness and completeness.
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The field of empirical secure software engineering is still in its infancy and
more work is needed to objectively quantify the cost and performance of many
techniques in the field of software security. This paper contributes to giving some
momentum to the field. However, the authors want to stress that the challenge is
also of a methodological nature. It is often hard to define a measure for the security
properties. Hence it is difficult to assess whether the results of a technique are
“good.” We have assessed the work of the teams by means of false positives and
false negatives, which is a commonplace way of reporting results in security. To
this aim we started from an operational definition of true positives, false positives
and false negatives that is both crisp and easy to apply. These definitions enable
the objective and repeatable assessment of the artifacts, e.g., the analysis results
in our case.
This paper also generates a number of interesting research questions that could
be the subject of future experimental work. For instance, the false negatives (incor-
rect results) could be caused by the misinterpretation of some template threats in
the checklists. Testing the comparative efficacy of alternative threat trees might un-
earth the root cause of the errors made by the participants of this study. Similarly,
the cause of the high number of false negatives (overlooked threats) is particularly
worthy of investigating. The outcome of such studies would lead to improvements
in the field of threat modeling that are grounded in actual fact. Ultimately, this
would contribute to the long-term mission of a sounder discipline of secure software
engineering.
References
1. Anonymized: Experimental material. http://goo.gl/EHnL3
2. Avgeriou, P., Grundy, J., Hall, J., Lago, P., Mistrik, I. (eds.): Relating Software Require-
ments and Architectures. Springer (2011)
3. Berander, P.: Using students as subjects in requirements prioritization. In: International
Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering (ISESE) (2004)
4. Carver, J., Jaccheri, L., Morasca, S.: A checklist for integrating student empirical studies
with research and teaching goals. Empirical Software Engineering 15(1) (2010)
5. Chandra, P., Wohleber, T., Feragamo, J., Williams, J.: CLASP v1.2: Comprehensive,
lightweight application security process. Tech. rep., OWASP (2007)
6. Clements, P., Kazman, R., Klein, M.: Evaluating Software Architectures: Methods and
Case Studies. Addison-Wesley (2001)
7. Deng, M., Wuyts, K., Scandariato, R., Preneel, B., Joosen, W.: A privacy threat analysis
framework. Requirements Engineering 16(1), 3–32 (2011)
8. Dhillon, D.: Developer-driven threat modeling: Lessons learned in the trenches. IEEE
Security & Privacy (2011)
9. Diallo, M., Romero-Mariona, J., Sim, S.E., Alspaugh, T., Richardson, D.: A comparative
evaluation of three approaches to specifying security requirements. In: Working Conference
on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ) (2006)
10. Grimes, D., Schulz, K.: Descriptive studies: what they can and cannot do. The Lancet
359, 145–149 (2002)
11. Haley, C., Laney, R., Moffett, J., Nuseibeh, B.: Security requirements engineering: A frame-
work for representation and analysis. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 34(1),
133–153 (2008)
12. Hernan, S., Lambert, S., Ostwald, T., Shostack, A.: Uncover security
design flaws using the STRIDE approach. MSDN Magazine (2006).
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc163519.aspx
13. Heyman, T., Yskout, K., Scandariato, R., Schmidt, H., Yu, Y.: The security twin peaks.
In: International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems (ESSoS) (2011)
A descriptive study of Microsoft’s threat modeling technique 29
14. Hogganvik, I., Lund, M., Stølen, K.: Reducing the effort to comprehend risk models:
Textlabels are often preferred over graphical means. Risk Analysis 51(5), 916–932 (2009)
15. Hogganvik, I., Stølen, K.: On the comprehension of security risk scenarios. In: International
Workshop on Program Comprehension (IWPC) (2005)
16. Hogganvik, I., Stølen, K.: A graphical approach to risk identification motivated by empir-
ical investigations. In: International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages
and Systems (MoDELS) (2006)
17. Ho¨st, M., Regnell, B., Wohlin, C.: Using students as subjects–a comparative study ofs-
tudents and professionals in lead-time impact assessment. Journal of Empirical Software
Engineering 5(3) (2000)
18. Howard, M., Lipner, S.: The Security Development Lifecycle. Microsoft Press (2006)
19. Ingalsbe, J., Kunimatsu, L., Baeten, T., Mead, N.: Threat modeling: Diving into the deep
end. IEEE Software 25(1), 28–34 (2008)
20. Johnstone, M.: Threat modelling with STRIDE and UML. In: Australian Information
Security Management Conference (2010)
21. Karpati, P., Opdahl, A., Sindre, G.: Experimental comparison of misuse case maps with
misuse cases and system architecture diagrams for eliciting security vulnerabilities and
mitigations. In: International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)
(2011)
22. Karpati, P., Sindre, G., Matulevicius, R.: Comparing misuse case and mal-activity dia-
grams for modelling social engineering attacks. International Journal of Secure Software
Engineering 3(2) (2012)
23. KU Leuven: DigiNews project. http://goo.gl/M6xkF
24. van Lamsweerde, A.: Elaborating security requirements by construction of intentional
anti-models. In: International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE) (2004)
25. McGraw, G.: Software Security: Building Security In. Addison-Wesley (2006)
26. McGraw, G., Migues, S., West, J.: Building security in maturity model (BSIMM4). Tech.
rep., Cigital (2012)
27. Meland, P., Tøndel, I., Jensen, J.: Idea: Reusability of threat models–two approaches with
an experimental evaluation. In: Engineering Secure Software and Systems (ESSoS) (2010)
28. Myagmar, S., Lee, A., Yurcik, W.: Threat modeling as a basis for security requirements.
In: Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Security (SREIS) (2005)
29. Nuseibeh, B.: Weaving together requirements and architectures. IEEE Computer 34(3)
(2001)
30. Opdahl, A.L., Sindre, G.: Experimental comparison of attack trees and misuse cases for
security threat identification. Information and Software Technology 51(5), 916–932 (2009)
31. OWASP: Mobile security project: Mobile threat model.
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
32. Runeson, P.: Using students as experiment subjects–an analysis on graduate and fresh-
men student data. In: International Conference on Empirical Assessment in Software
Engineering (EASE) (2003)
33. Schaad, A., Borozdin, M.: TAM2: Automated threat analysis. In: Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Applied Computing (SAC) (2012)
34. Schneier, B.: Attack trees: Modeling security threats. Dr. Dobb’s Journal (1999)
35. Shostack, A.: Experiences threat modeling at Microsoft. In: Workshop on Modeling Secu-
rity (ModSec) (2008)
36. Shostack, A.: Getting started with the SDL Threat Modeling Tool. MSDN Magazine
(2009). http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/dd347831.aspx
37. Sindre, G., Opdahl, A.L.: Templates for misuse case description. In: Workshop on Re-
quirements Engineering: Foundations for Software Quality (REFSQ) (2002)
38. Sindre, G., Opdahl, A.L.: Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases. Requirements
Engineering 10(1), 34–44 (2005)
39. Svahnberg, M., Aurum, A., Wohlin, C.: Using students as subjects–an empirical evalua-
tion. In: International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement
(ESEM) (2008)
40. Tichy, W.: Hints for reviewing empirical work in software engineering. Empirical Software
Engineering 5(4) (2000)
41. Torr, P.: Demystifying the threat-modeling process. IEEE SEcurity and Privacy 3(5)
(2005)
42. Van Landuyt, D., Gregoire, J., Michiels, S., Truyen, E., Joosen, W.: Architectural design
of a digital publishing system. Tech. rep., KU Leuven (2006)
